Dimensional Address as Rigid Designation: How DAG-OR Grounds Reference Without Metaphysical Posit
Abstract
The problem of reference — what makes a name, description, or term reliably
track its object — has generated three dominant frameworks in the analytic
tradition: Frege's sense/reference distinction, Russell's theory of definite
descriptions, and Kripke's rigid designators. Each framework achieves genuine
explanatory traction, yet each ultimately defers the grounding question: what
anchors the link between expression and world? This paper argues that the
Dimensional Address Grammar for Observable Reality (DAG-OR), as formalised
in the Modulign Standard v3.0, provides the first structurally grounded theory of
reference. Under DAG-OR, reference is not a relation between a name and a
metaphysically posited object, nor between a description and a logical value, but
between an address expression and a uniquely identified entity in the Entity
Registry of the observable address space. It is argued here that DAG-OR achieves
Kripkean rigidity as an empirical consequence, dissolves the Fregean
sense/reference gap by collapsing it into a single address structure, and
characterises reference failure through a principled UNK-resolution mechanism
rather than logical indeterminacy. The implications extend to natural language
semantics and natural kind terms. Indexicals and demonstratives fall outside the
scope of the present argument and are reserved for subsequent treatment.
Keywords: reference, rigid designation, Kripke, Frege, Russell, DAG-OR,
Modulign, Modulign Standard, philosophy of language, dimensional address,
entity identity, Entity Registry
Cite it
Gonzalez, V. (2026). Dimensional Address as Rigid Designation: How DAG-OR Grounds Reference Without Metaphysical Posit. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19557382