The problem of reference — what makes a name, description, or term reliably track its object — has generated three dominant frameworks in the analytic tradition: Frege's sense/reference distinction, Russell's theory of definite descriptions, and Kripke's rigid designators. Each framework achieves genuine explanatory traction, yet each ultimately defers the grounding question: what anchors the link between expression and world? This paper argues that the Dimensional Address Grammar for Observable Reality (DAG-OR), as formalised in the Modulign Standard v3.0, provides the first structurally grounded theory of reference. Under DAG-OR, reference is not a relation between a name and a metaphysically posited object, nor between a description and a logical value, but between an address expression and a uniquely identified entity in the Entity Registry of the observable address space. It is argued here that DAG-OR achieves Kripkean rigidity as an empirical consequence, dissolves the Fregean sense/reference gap by collapsing it into a single address structure, and characterises reference failure through a principled UNK-resolution mechanism rather than logical indeterminacy. The implications extend to natural language semantics and natural kind terms. Indexicals and demonstratives fall outside the scope of the present argument and are reserved for subsequent treatment. Keywords: reference, rigid designation, Kripke, Frege, Russell, DAG-OR, Modulign, Modulign Standard, philosophy of language, dimensional address, entity identity, Entity Registry
Gonzalez, V. (2026). Dimensional Address as Rigid Designation: How DAG-OR Grounds Reference Without Metaphysical Posit. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19557382